Boeing's Downfall [Greed Over Safety] feat. Mentour Pilot

It was fun to take part! Great production.

From "If it's not Boeing I'm not going" to "If it's Boeing I'm not going" we all grew up.

"When one door closes, another opens." ~ Boeing.

There is one interesting quotes "you can teach business to engineer, but can't teach engineering to businessman"

I was a QA Inspector for McDonnell Douglas in St Louis. Then Boeing took over. My QA management was forced out or reassigned to some other job, and I then reported to production management, which created a huge conflict of interest because the floor manager's only interest was to send the product out as quickly as possible, and I wanted it done correctly per blueprint and process specifications and free of defects. Boeing also implemented what they called "OV", or Operator Verification, meaning the technicians would inspect/approve their own work without any input from an Inspector. My Inspector job transitioned into Quality Auditor, whereupon I would audit the processes, but not the product. Whenever I did find something defective, I would write a Nonconformance report, and the floor manager would invariably countermand/delete my report. So I would simply issue another NR right behind the one the floor manager deleted. Eventually I was fired for "insubordination" for simply following the established procedures. I want full back pay back to my May 2012 termination date up to now. Plus I want punitive and compensatory damages.

Putting MBAs in charge of any company where they don't actually understand how the technology works always leads to disaster.

Uh, the Boeing whistleblower is dead...

So much better than any other documentary I’ve seen on the subject. My now deceased brother-in-law headed the team at Goodrich that wrote the technical manuals for the Dreamliner. He always said he would never fly a Dreamliner… the potential issues were too numerous and without solutions. He did not do the manuals for the 737 Max, but he’d heard that new software was potentially problematic.

The way it was when I worked for pratt & whitney in Ireland,if you made a mistake and held up your hand the mistake was fixed and there was not a problem....it was encouraged....if you tried to cover up your mistake or not own up to it or tried to blame someone else for your mistake you could be disciplined from a warning a suspension or even lose your job,so it was in your interest to raise your hand... We also used the ace tools like root cause analysis etc to find out how the mistake happened and to make sure it never happened again with targets of zero escapes which we achieved. Then we were shut down and our jobs moved to america and singapore ....😢

My dad was an engineer at Boeing for 47 years. I grew up with the company and watching the changed taking place. I remember as a kid, hearing the name Harry Stonecipher from my dad with absolute disdain. He and other engineers were basically told by Boeing leadership that the problem with engineers is that they don't understand business. My dad was forced to retire back in 2015. He refuses to help Boeing these days.

I'm an Automotive technician and let me tell you, when their own technicians refused to board the same planes they fixed you know something shady is going on. Sad people had to die for greed again.

Heart breaking. I remember in the 1970s the 707 flights Lusaka-Nairobi-Bombay and back. We felt so safe and thrilled on 4-engine jetliners. Now we're travelling by train. Imprison the honchos of finance and engineering and the CEO. No trial required.

When booking a flight always ask what Aircraft you are booked on.

Letting any company regulate themselves, be it Aerospace, Pharma or Agri is insane, and a great example of how stupid we are, to allow this to happen.

As a retired Boeing systems engineer from 1987 to 2010, I witness the glory days of Boeing and the emergent new Boeing. During those early days, the Company was truly run by engineers, and many were old-timers who didn't cut any corners. The words I heard the most throughout my tenure with the Company were "Airworthiness and Quality Engineering and Assurance." Meetings were held on these topics seemingly on a daily basis.

A couple of issues here: At 7:45, Capt. Petter explains that MCAS moves the vertical stabilizer…incorrect. The vertical stabilizer is part of the rudder which controls the yaw axis. The correct term is the elevator which is part of the horizontal stabilizer which controls pitch authority. Prior to that however, Petter suggests that there were no issues with the flight characteristics of the MAX aircraft and that it was a stable design…questionable. Perhaps from a pilot’s viewpoint, but from a regulatory perspective, the MAX should never have been certified to begin with. Moving the larger engines forward was only one impact of the redesign. The other was to change the camber of the wing to accommodate the larger diameter engine nacelles in the re-engined MAX. This new shape of the wing changed the flying characteristics of the MAX dramatically from the previous models of 737 aircraft. In fact, it made the design negatively stable in certain angles of attack necessitating the MCAS modification. This is expressly contrary to the FAA’s Aircraft Certification protocols for Air Transport category aircraft requiring them to be POSITIVELY stable in all unusual attitudes expected during normal operations. The MAX should never have been certified as a Transport Category aircraft AT ALL due to these modifications. Read The Challenger Launch Decision by Diane Vaughn to get a good primer on the concept of the “normalization of deviance” and compare to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report that cited the very same financial and political pressures exerted on NASA that derogated safety. In between those reports, as a palate cleanser, I would suggest reading Broken Rails by Christian Wolmar that provides a scathing account of how the privatization of the British Rail system led to disastrous consequences. All of this carnage could have been anticipated and avoided had safety been given its appropriate place in the top priorities of these endeavors rather than as lip service by the bean counting flunkies at Boeing.

"Employees are afraid of retaliation when making complaints." Chilling that a Boeing whistle blower was recently found deceased under questionable circumstances.

It is not only corporate governance problem, but also US government lobbying system problem.

I worked for a company that made turbine blades for airplane engines and its inline with the video. MFG company was aquired by private equity firm who stopped re investing in operations and allowed facility to fail into disrepair. The manufacturing process could no longer produce parts within spec but a culture of fear and blaming lower level employees meant that nothing would interrupt production. Common practice included repeatedly processing the same part thru inspection and changing the serial number for parts that couldn't pass. I left that company about 4 years ago thinking it's only a matter of time before it comes down on them.

This happens when redundancy is removed in order to reduce costs, QC check points removed, and the less costly personal is preferred