A Perfect Storm of Mistakes! And how Heroic Pilots Almost solved it.

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These kinds of accidents hit the hardest, where a crew was operating by the book and still got doomed because of stuff outside of their control.

This accident is a direct result of "normalizing deviance". A facility that requires workers to violate safety norms (in this case cross a red line), has set their workers up to have an accident.

It’s incredible that the pilots of the MD-87 were smart enough to not only input their controls seconds after the collision but they also made the correct inputs and kept that plane from hitting the terminal. They probably didn’t even have enough time to register what had actually happened but we’re still able to make clear and correct decisions in the few seconds they had left. Unbelievable piloting. I can’t even begin to imagine how many people would’ve been killed if that plane hit the terminal at that speed.

I work as a train driver, and I have learned the hard way how respect for the signals basic color and meaning is of utmost importance. The infrastructure developer where I once worked, had to rebuild the signals on the entire freight train terminal which used to be my base, many years ago. To get it done quicker, they cut corners and got my company to agree on doing things differently than the rule books said. Usually when you build a new signaling system, once installed but not in use yet, you turn the signals away from the drivers view and put a large "X" on them, clearly marking them as "not in service". With my companies blessing, the infrastructure developer skipped these steps, turned the signals on 24/7 during the construction period (for testing etc.), and told us drivers to ignore them (pass them even if they say "stop"). Having done the EASA ATPL-H exams, I knew from the syllabus of Human Factors, that this was a bad idea, so I protested, but to no avail. We had some bad mishaps because of it, derailments and what not, once the signaling system was put to use. Cutting corners has never been good for safety.

This was not the failure of the safety management - this was the complete absence of a safety management. Thank you very much for bringing up this tragic story!

I have personally lost friends and colleagues in that perfectly avoidable accident. I still remember the unreal atmosphere at work that fateful morning. My blood boils every time I hear the amount of carelessness and sloppiness that managed to kill 118 persons. A big thank you to Mentour Pilot for his clear and always tactful description of the events.

I can't believe how much of a shitshow this was - the tower not being informed of runway/taxiway markings, leading to major confusion around a plane's location, then the tower not activating 'emergency mode' after a phone call about an explosion and injured people, then the tower not being made aware of fire trucks racing to the baggage -building fire. What the hell, Italy?!

When u mentioned the stop light, it made my blood boil. I've seen something simmilar happen before on a train station, where the sound signal sometimes wouldn't play on train approaching and sometimes play out when there was no train approaching at all. So ppl were used to ignoring the signal, which led to death of a young boy. What is more outrageous, is that this issue wasn't fixed even after the incident.

I will never forget 8th of October 2001... My girlfriend and I was flying from CDG to CPH with SAS, but on the way to the airport, we heard on the radio that a SAS aircraft had crashed in Milano, and they were unsure if it was due to a terrorist attack. Remember this was shortly after 9/11. The ground crew in CDG were obviously chocked, our plane was cancelled and everything was chaos, After 5-6 hours of wait, we were booked on a SAS flight from CDG to ARN, and from there we flew ARN to CPH. The atmosphere on these flights were very depressed, and seeing the crew keeping up their duties was impressive in every way, considering they had lost some of their colleagues earlier that day. RIP all onboard SK686.

The quality and detail in these videos are unmatched. I'm an engineer by trade, and the detailed, factual approach to these investigations and reports speaks directly to my engineering brain.

So many similarities to Tenerife. Limited visibility, confusion of taxi directions, lack of ground radar, non-standard communication language/phrases, complacency with non-regulation procedures and everybody thought things were fine until a shape comes looming out of the fog. However at Tenerife both sets of pilots knew there was another plane on the runway and it was a case of pilot error assuming the runway was clear, disaster could have been averted with a single additional radio call or better CRM. Here the pilots did everything right, having no indication whatsoever of any issues but still payed the ultimate price. The technology was there, it used to work, but was never repaired after failing, a simple taxiway sign could have prevented tragedy, cost cutting and complacency at its worst. The events of 24 years earlier were lost on the airport management, who did not learn from history and were doomed to repeat it.

My dad was supposed to be on that flight but couldn't go because of other meetings he had to attend in Milan. 3 of his colleagues died and he never spoke of it again after the dust was settled. It was a very weird period, also because everything happened due to stupid mistakes, carelessness and corruption, all things rather common in Italy.

As a fellow pilot I also feel so deeply for the sas crew. I can't imagine anything worse than being given no chance because of another person's mistakes.

Considering the conditions and practices at the airport, it is a wonder that an accident didn’t happen sooner. Such a tragedy, but it’s clear that without a major incident all these improprieties would simply have continued. As a very nervous flyer, I would never have believed it if someone had told me a year ago that this channel would become my favorite and most consistently consumed form of media. But everything from the production values to the writing and presentation is top notch. I have learned so much and even feel better about flying.

Aircraft engineer here. The total lack of safety measures and bad practices that lead to this accident are just beyond me. I can not overstate just how important it is to have a mental map of the airport you're operating on as well as being crystal clear in communication with ground control. I remember back in the day when taxiing an RJ to the tech platform for an engine run up i got clearance to cross the runway yet the stop bar was lit. It was a super foggy morning and this was an active runway. I read back "unable to cross, lit stop bar, (AC registration)" followed by a much faster speaking controller who acknowledged and corrected his mistake. One 5 sec read back to clarify the situation was all it took to avoid a possible disaster. Listening to both air and ground, having a clear map of the field, check with crew, ask for confirmation...everything that can build a bigger situational awareness is and always will be absolutely essential.

About the Cessna Citation, 3 of the 4 occupants initially survived after being struck by the MD-87, but due to the delayed emergency response, it took firefighters 25 minutes to reach the Cessna, by the time they arrived, all 4 occupants in the Cessna were killed. Autopsy showed that the 3 initial survivors had high traces of smoke in their lungs, meaning that they were burned alive

I was working in Stockholm at this time on the design of a new 3G mobile network, commuting from France each week. One of my radio planning colleagues commuted from Milan. He was on this plane, and never made it. We later had a memorial plaque for him in our office. Operating an airport in fog with no ground control radar was criminal.

I think one of the most damning things about this disaster was the fact that the airport had bought a new ground radar system but not installed it, citing 'technical reasons'. The new system was installed not long after the accident.

I remember very well this tragedy: at that time was flying back and forth to Milan twice a week and quite always from Linate early in the morning. I could have been on that SAS flight. Thank you for bringing back this to our memory. Not an expert here, but have always asked to myself how has it been possible that such a foggy airport has been cleared to handle traffic in such low visibility conditions without having clear runaway indications, fully functional lights and a ground working radar! This, out of all, is imho the main cause of this accident!