China's Secret Masterplan for Taiwan's Invasion

72,079
0
Published 2023-12-08
Discover the tiny island determining the future of international relations: Kinmen.

Interested in such stories? Subscribe youtube.com/@context.matters 🚁🚁🚁

This video explores Kinmen's strategic importance and the immense challenges it poses for U.S. foreign policy. Uncover the historical context, potential military scenarios, and geopolitical implications of this lesser-known but vitally significant region.

▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
Thank you so much for watching. If you liked this video, hit the 👍 and let us know what you thought in the comments 💬

#ContextMatters #EconomicsExplained #TheRedLine #China #Taiwan #USA

▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀

Context Matters is Produced by @EconomicsExplained and @TheRedLi

All Comments (21)
  • @alanbrown342
    I have been to Kinmen 4 times, as my brother-in-law's family lives there (although they seem likely to move in a couple years when my nephew finishes high school). I love the place. There's a few details this video misses. First - before the Chinese Civil War, Kinmen did not have close ties to Taiwan - it was part of Fujian province. It was only because the KMT was able to retain control of this island during their retreat in 1949 that it stayed part of the ROC. As a result, Kinmen has stronger cultural ties with the mainland, and often is estranged from the politics of the ruling party in Taiwan. Many of the arguments that Taiwan has a culturally distinct history from mainland China - used to justify independence - do not apply to Kinmen. Furthermore, while Kinmen was in an incredibly tense situation with mainland China up through the 1980's, in recent decades people travelled freely between the two (in the last 3-5 years, political tensions and Covid had reduced this traffic significantly). The most convenient way to get to Kinmen was to fly in Xiamen and take a ferry boat to Kinmen. There is a big duty-free mall on the island to service mainlanders; in turn, people in Kinmen used to go to Xiamen to shop every few months. Although Kinmen maintains a back-up water supply, water pipes from the mainland are the major source. It's a common sentiment on Kinmen that, while they want democracy, they don't want to become a major battleground in a conflict. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4mF5X6unpRw I have also heard it speculated that - were by some miracle Taiwan managed to negotiate and convince the PRC to accept independence - they might agree to give back Kinmen as part of the deal. My niece's boyfriend's father was from Kinmen, his mother from the mainland; this sort of relationship is not unheard of. All this makes me feel - were China to only take Kinmen by force - it would not be a good idea to "send in the U.S. Marines". Harsh sanctions, certainly, but do not curse Kinmen with the role of being the battleground of great powers yet again.
  • @ezra3028
    One thing missed out here is that the shoal being taken is a huge matter - Its not about the land, but rather the exclusive economic zone that comes with the land, around the waters, allowing China to lay claim to fishing, oil reserves, and more all within the area around the shoal, that would've originally belonged to another country (the shoal was contested by more than one country)
  • @YellowCable
    A bit superficial. Instead of thinking what would US and TW do after an invasion of KinMen, you need to think about what would China do. At that point the element of surprise is lost and massive arming and preparations would start to defend TW, with China becoming completely isolated as its intentions become obvious. It would only make sense for China if literally the same day it starts the invasion of the tw island proper.
  • @kingofthesofas
    I love both economics explained and the redline podcast so this channel seems perfect for me thanks for putting this together
  • @MrSpherical
    goodluck with the new channel guys! Interesting angle.
  • @karmamell2532
    This Video seems a bit too inflammatory for my taste, first of all: the existence of Kinmen and its vulnerability to a chinese invasion WAS covered before on youtube, Real Life lore and Polymatter mentioned them in Videos a few months back (and no offense to these channels, but if Real Life Lore has covered something it is not "never mentioned anywhere") That aside, I feel like the Video is leaving out some important context for some of their examples (to make their analysis seem more dramatic): - Putin was not just emboldened after taking Crimea because Russia wasn't immediately attacked by NATO, but because especially western european countries reacted mostly apathetically to the invasion, with only the UK and the US sending limited military support to Ukraine, and germany continuing to work on Nordstream 2, pretending like nothing happened. If, according to your sources, the US would react to a chinese invasion of Kinmen by deploying troops to Mainland Taiwan, it would be the equivalent of the US deploying troops to mainland Ukraine after 2014 (which would have emboldened Putin a lot less) - I do agree that Invading a populated Island like Kinmen would still cause more of a public outcry than the Scarborough Shoal, but just saying "If the occupation of a lifeless rock is that concerning, imagine what a populated Island would do" leaves out the important context that the Scarborough Shoal was not "just" a lifeless Rock in the ocean when China occupied it. After claiming it, China officially stated that it was part of their territory now, and that meant that it would expand the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone in a 10 Mile Radius around the island, claiming the Hydrocarbon and Fishing resources right off the Phillipine Coast. That is important context, and that is also why the phillipinos have been so worried about these Island claiming projects. - Finally, I'm not sure what this Videos conclusion is supposed to be. I feel like the Authors claim is that China invading Kinmen would "Completely upend the status Quo throughout Asia" 1:02 making it sound like it would break american Influence. In my opinion, the opposite would be the case. Yes, the US would not be able to take the island back by force and Taiwan would be very upset, but it would also mean that China has officially begun trying to get their will by military force. This would cause any country which may have Territorial disputes with China to increase their reliance on US protection, not decrease it (and there are also the devastating economic sanctions to think about); There is a good reason why the Chinese Government has thus far NOT attacked Kinmen. A much more interesting analysis would have been on what it may take for the Chinese to actually change their mind and go through with an Invasion of Kinmen, aka what the chinese would be hoping from this. Would they do it to win an easy military victory to appease an unhappy population? Does Xi Jinping maybe believe some weird conspiracy theories or cultural theories on why he should Invade? I don't know, but THAT would have definitely been a take that I wouldn't have heard of yet.
  • @TaLuVs
    I really, really, REALLY like this channel. I've just watched your three videos and I enjoyed them all. I wish you well for the future.
  • @jaydee6268
    Not sure that experts are not tracking this. I have floated a crazy idea that the seat of the RoC move to Kinmen, and concurrently “Taiwan” declares independence. Then let the RoC unit with the PRC and formally end the Chinese civil war. Alternatively, I have floated the idea that the RoC and the US concurrently announce that Taiwan won’t seek formal independence nor would the US recognize Taiwan’s formal independence, unless the PRC takes over any part of Taiwan. Kinmen is pretty much like a crashable gate, meaning it’s not there to keep people out but to show intent.
  • @gamer0seven
    This is a great use of AI art. indicated as such, non-superrealistic and it helps a lot trying to imagine news and pictures of hypothetical scenarios.
  • @SuperPrem
    Good to see that this channel also produces quality content. Wish it the best.
  • @enemixius
    I think it's not just about the US's ambiguity, but also about China's. Taking Kinmen will effectively end the current status quo and commit China to an open conflict. The other examples of annexation had the issue of being somewhat unexpected, Kinmen on the other hand is an obvious canary. China could easily take it, by not doing so they can stay ambiguous as well and keep diplomatic pressure on everyone without really committing to anything.
  • @murdermittensnyc
    THANK YOU ❤❤ so glad to see you bring up the details. I say Shoal island in convo and get nothing but blank stares … in San Diego. You know, kind of a Navy town and whatnot. If only we had a consistent, principle based policy. It’s like the serial killer who finally gets caught and during his trial it comes out that he was reprimanded for burning cats alive when he was a teen but no one pushed back … people really do show you who they are. Let us accept that and pay attention to their messages. Believe the actions. Congrats on the new channel and please keep beating the drum! ❤❤
  • @stephoh8613
    Great presentation and highlight! I am slightly desapointed that option 3 is not explored a little more here. What are the "Do something" options? Economic sanctions of course, but that is a pretty low bar in escalation. What about a "tit for tat" and a formal recognition of Tibet independance (and of course, Taiwan)? Or of disputed lands in the Himalayas by India (benefit of bringing another power in the conflict against China)? Or blockade of the malacca straits and all the straits around Japanese islands, which would certainly trigger a chinese answer, but that would be further away from their territory and easier to sell domestically as it would be a chinese agression on US blockading vessels that would be the trigger, not a US attack on China + much easier to defend as the US and its allies would be the ones controlling the islands around, rather than attacking an island basically on mainland China. So all that to say... China also could lose in a scenario where they just seize Kinmen and that is probably why they haven't done it... yet.
  • @homebrandrules
    congratulations on this new channel. this is the first vid. for me to watch. EXCELLENT QUALITY...
  • @MrRoygeneable
    It's a small quibble, but it's pronounced "Jinmen." They use a quirky transliteration method from way back that for some reason had the 'j' sound written as 'k.' On a more substantial note, I'm curious why you're so quick to discount what you label as Option 3. I'm also extremely curious why we would necessarily view such a thing as the reestablishing of a direct U.S. military presence on the main island under the Taiwan/ROC government's control as a strategic defeat for the United States. If anything, from a military strategic standpoint, a PRC invasion and occupation of Kinmen undertaken independently of a full-scale war of annihilation against the Taiwan/ROC government, occupation of all Taiwan/ROC-governed territories, and sufficient measures to preempt a U.S.-led counterattack would be more than enough pretext for the United States and its allies to quickly and resolutely close the final link in the First Island Chain for good—and likely with the enthusiastic support of the Taiwanese voting public and other democracies in the region to boot. China would be effectively encircled within its immediately-offshore sphere of influence for the foreseeable future with each link in the chain then having a vested interest in not being the weakest link. The First Island Chain includes the Japanese Home Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. If you imagine it as a line drawn with pencil, it gets smudged over Taiwan due to the complicated diplomatic dance all the parties involved participate in to maintain certain politically-expedient fictions. We know one of China's strategic objectives is to secure unimpeded access to the global ocean. So, if it would be such a fait accompli for the PRC to seize Kinmen by force on its own, we should ask ourselves why they have not already done so. The answer is due to the PRC being the primary beneficiary of that smudged line that must stretch far out of its natural path to incorporate a tiny little island in Xiamen harbor. That island, Kinmen, was retained by KMT forces at enormous cost in the hopes it would one day be the forward launching point for a reinvasion of the mainland. That is no longer a thing that is plausibly going to happen, yet the springboard for the invasion remains gathering dust. Taiwan is currently the weakest link, but only artificially so as the Taiwanese predisposition toward the West would make a rapid integration into the Western security framework much easier to achieve than could China achieve in reverse. Chinese restraint toward Kinmen makes it too diplomatically and politically complicated at present for U.S. military decision makers to achieve the much more tightly interlocked chain that they doubtlessly would prefer. If the PRC has any shot at all at achieving its strategic objectives of conquering Taiwan and gaining unimpeded access to the global ocean, it only has one before the demographic crisis only now starting really gets going in earnest by the end of this decade. They aren't going to waste that chance on a strategically irrelevant backwater like Kinmen in the absence of a larger plan to solve the Taiwan problem entirely. The fact is that the time to really worry about China attacking Taiwan was from about 8 years ago up until when the pandemic started. Luckily, nothing happened, but it was hardly because the world was paying all the attention to this issue that it is now. Taiwan has very deftly made itself an essential link in the wider global economic chain while avoiding overt antagonism toward China due to lingering fond sentiment toward the motherland among certain sizable elements of the Taiwanese voting public. A Chinese attack on Kinmen would bring unwanted clarity to an issue that so far has been kept sufficiently muddled as to remain open-ended and unanswered. Following such an attack, the USAF would be wise to reestablish bases—though perhaps not openly at first—on the main island of Taiwan as well as outlying islands like Penghu and Matsu if the latter isn't also taken in the initial PRC assault. The line would no longer be smudged. Strategic ambiguity, if such a thing ever existed, would be well and truly dead.  So, I think the concern about Kinmen is overblown and more reflects a 1950s-era view of the situation than it does one in the 2020s. Everyone who knows enough knows that Kinmen is neither something to be overly concerned about nor something to needlessly provoke Beijing over given its near complete geopolitical irrelevance. Beijng is in a weak geopolitical position; an unprovoked attack on Kinmen would only make it weaker.
  • @TOPNOTCH80
    Great video looking forward to this channel